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Abstract 
 The beginning of the study of financing mix is after the Modigliani 
and Miller theorem and its unrealistic assumptions under which the source of 
finance does not impact the capital structure of the firm. Continuously after 
the M-M theorem new theories are developed. In this paper we are going to 
look at these alternative theories for sources of financing with a specific 
detail on the: Trade off theory and Pecking order theory. We provide 
evidence how this theories cope in practice of business. 
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Introduction 
 The theory has little to say on the optimal structure of financing mix 
of the companies generally and especially for transition countries. On one 
side we have the age of debt finance suggesting that companies should rely 
on debt finances, on the other side we have the age of equity finance 
suggesting for equity finance; while another group of researches is testing 
whether there is an optimal capital structure where companies should attain 
the latter with a portfolio of financing. Aaker and Jacobson (1987) 
demonstrated that the systematic risk can impact the profitability of the firm. 
Less profitable firms usually look at external financing. Accordingly we may 
suggest a link between systematic risk, profitability and sources of financing. 
 Companies are not self sufficient, and in order to grow they need 
financing continuously. Choosing the source of financing may look simple 
and may take a little time to decide it, but however it is not a straightforward 
answer. The management of the firm should decide whether they will use 
internal or external sources of financing, whether they will chose debt or 
equity. Alternative theories try to answer this question questioning whether 
this should be a random answer, based on historical preferences or is 
dependent on firm specific factors.  
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Alternative theories of capital structure 
 The literature highlights the importance of asymmetric information, 
agency problem, taxation and corporate control in determining the choice 
between equity and debt. There are costs and benefits of choosing a certain 
financing policy, choosing debt or/and equity, therefore the optimum choice 
will be based on the tradeoffs of these costs and benefits. The basis of the 
research among researches based on debt/equity ratio is whether this is 
targeted or flexible for companies. 
 The insight of the question how companies choose their financing mix 
originate from MM (Modilgiani-Miller) 1958 preposition and is still an area 
of research. Academicians and researches have concluded that MM 
preposition does not hold, and try to suggest new theories in figuring out the 
reasoning and explanations with new theories but yet the puzzle remains 
unsolved; the evidence is scarce and ambiguous.   Theoretically different 
theories based on their assumption may hold, but with no evidence they are 
not reliable. Choosing the best optimal capital structure is rather a difficult 
task considering that the goal is minimizing the overall cost of capital. By 
identifying optimal structure a firm could maximize its value; therefore we 
see the importance and interest to study the subject in some detail. As a result 
of the research we have a number of alternative theories trying to help to find 
the right answer. Some of the theories on grounds of which a further research 
is done are: Agency cost theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1978; Jensen, 1986; 
Myers, 1977); Pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf); Asymmetric 
information theory (Ross, 1977). In this paper we are going to look at 
alternative theories for sources of financing with specific details on the: 
Trade off theory and Pecking order theory. 
 Companies will have bankruptcy cost in a case of financial distress 
when they are not able to repay their debt. Banks ussually do not trust 
companies that fail to pay their debt and therefore they are limited in 
obtaining credit. On one hand such companies have high probability to face 
bankruptcy cost and costs expressed as a opportunity cost of not being able to 
obtain credit that they can use on attractive investments. Therefore we may 
conclude that expected bankruptcy cost and financial distress worsen the 
firms value. 
 Agency cost arise as a consequence of conflict of interest betwean the 
principle and the agent. Having different goals of maximizing their own 
interests wich represents a conflicting interest to the other party resullts to 
what is known as agency cost. Agency cost and bankruptcy costs are 
positively corelated with debt; the higher the debt the higher the agency cost 
and bankruptcy costs, a statement that describes the link betwean capital 
structure and these costs.  
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 In figure1 we have shown different theories on capital structure and 
the tools they use to explain the theory. But can taxes or asymmetric 
information or agency cost independently explain the whole picture of capital 
structure?    
 
Trade off theory  
 Trade off theory  suggests that companies are partly financed by debt 
and partly by equity whereas the choice is made based on cost benefit 
analysis. If a company chooses financing by debt is has to compare the tax 
benefit i.e. a benefit from financing with debt on one hand with bankruptcy 
costs and financial distress with on the other hand are costs of financing with 
debt. So if tax relief offsets the bankruptcy and financial distress costs than 
the company should be financed by debt until that point. We should point out 
that by bankruptcy costs we mean both direct and indirect ones. Agency costs 
are also included and that may affect the capital structure of companies.  
Figure 1 Theories of capital structure 
 
In the illustration we have shown different theoris on capital structure 
and the tools they use to explain the theory. 
A large body of literature tests whether companies use target debt 
equity ratios. One group does test this target ratio at a time- the static trade 
off model; and the other group finds that there may be flexible target ratio 
introducing the dynamic trade off model (Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 
(2001), Strebulaev (2004), Flannery and Rangan (2006), and Kayhan and 
Titman (2007)). This means that through time there is no rigid target ratio but 
the ratio adjusts over time. It is empirically not possible to estimate the target 
ratio therefore most of papers estimate it with the parameter speed of 
adjustment. 
Companies’ borrowing is incentivized by tax advantages, but can they 
borrow indefinitely? This is the question that trade off theory answer. What 
the static trade off theory suggests is that companies chose a target 
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debt/equity ratio and then move towards it. Changing the mix of financing 
will make a change in stock prices therefore it is important to study this area. 
We may conclude that tax rates and banckurptcy costs are factors that more 
likely influence the structure of capital. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) introduced the model that in the world 
of no taxes and transaction cost the capital structure is irrelevant to the firm 
value and the same authors in 1963 employed taxes and suggested that in 
order to take tax advantages firms should rely on debt financing. MM in their 
preposition introduced the tax benefit. Nowadays their preposition is often 
called irrelevance preposition which states that under some assumptions it 
does not matter whether the firm chooses to be financed either by debt or 
equity.  What Modigliani –Miller (1958) suggest is that capital structure is 
irrelevant but researches note they do not add that this is true under perfect 
market assumptions. Contaraily their prepositions may suggest that market 
imperfections make capital structure relevant. Such imperfections may be the 
taxes which are one of the elements incorporated in the trade off theory. In 
practice and reality capital structure does matter. As a matter of fact is that 
the use of debt for financing is increasing. As long as the capital structure 
choice impacts the tax it means it impacts the firms’ value. Debt has the tax 
advantage. Whenever equity is issued this is bad signaling for the outsiders of 
the company- they may perceive as an inability to finance with debt whereas 
debt does not impact the firm value directly.  
 The assumptions which they introduced are as follows: 
• No taxes 
• No transaction costs 
• No bankruptcy costs 
• Equivalence in borrowing costs for both companies and investors 
• Symmetry of market information, meaning companies and investors 
have the same information 
• No effect of debt on a company's EBIT 
In the MM paper of 1966 they give an insight that taxes are important. 
Than if tax advantages are important for firms to be financed with debt than 
we can ask why firms do not rely on debt financing. Answering this question 
may lead us to the conclusion that trade-off theory cannot fully explain the 
differences of capital structure between different firms. When incorporating 
taxes we should also bear in mind that tax regulation are county varying and 
tax advantages are firm varying. What we are suggesting is that any empirical 
evidence for testing trade off theory should control for tax regulation and firm 
differences such as size and industry.  So debt and taxes on their own do not 
explain the capital structure. According to the trade off theory risky firms and 
firms that have tangible assets should borrow less compared to safe firms and 
firms that have intangible assets which should borrow more. Whereas 
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according to Miller model the optimum debt asset ratio is the point where 
marginal taxes benefit and marginal bankruptcy costs are equal. 
Myers calls the trade off  between tax savings and cost of financial 
distress which managers face when financing with debt as “static trade off 
theory”. Myers claims that financing by debt or equity is not a question for 
finance theory. Riskier debt is equal to equity in the finance theory. Myers 
“The most telling evidence against the static trade-off theory is the strong 
inverse correlation between profitability and financial leverage” p. 83 
Another fact that is discussed in the paper is that security issuing that 
increases leverage is considered as good news in corporate financing. “To 
repeat: high profits mean low debt. Yet the static trade-off story would 
predict just the opposite relationship. Higher profits mean more dollars for 
debt service and more taxable income to shield. They should mean higher 
target debt ratios.”p 84. Myers concludes that the static trade off theory fails 
to explain the inverse relationship between profitability and financial 
leverage as well as the fact that increasing leverage is good news whereas the 
opposite is bad news. Also he adds that pecking order theory has a 
comparative advantage in explaining these facts compared to trade off 
theory.Myers has contributed to the capital structure theories and reviewing 
the same with the most recent trends and has helped developing the trade off 
theory with his paper “Determinants of Corporate borrowing” and afterwards 
proposed the alternative pecking order theory on his paper “The capital 
structure puzzle”. 
According to the trade off theory countries with soft bankruptcy 
regimes will have higher market debt compared to the countries with rigid 
regimes and vice versa.” Within the trade-off theory, there is a debt 
‘‘pecking-order’ with bank debt being preferred to market debt because of the 
lower implied bankruptcy costs.” Hackbarth et al  p. 4. This raises another 
question of finding the optimal mixture of marked debt and bank debt. The 
model that they employ assumes that firms will prefer bank loans and that 
bank loans are preferred to small firms. Their conclusion is that weak firms 
extensively use bank debt whereas strong firms are more prone to use market 
debt as their debt financing. 
Zhao et al (2008) use Kalman filter to directly estimate the speed of 
adjustment and they overcome two problems the identification problem, and 
the firm heterogeneity of the sample problem; for the dynamic trade-off 
model. They test the dynamic trade off theory using quarterly data for a 
sample of 578 firms. Under the assumption that the target debt /equity ratio is 
constant they conclude that for 52% of the firms the model of trade off theory 
holds; and the same holds for 32% of the firm when the target debt-ratio is 
not constant. 
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The evidence testing trade off theory is usually with cross section- 
such they do test the static trade of theory; whereas little evidence is on the 
dynamic trade of theory. Some of studies that empirically test the dynamic 
trade of theory are: Lev and Pekelman (1975), Ang (1976), Taggart (1977), 
Marsh (1982), Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Auerbach (1985), Opler and 
Titman (1993) and Allen and Clissold (1998); Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999), Banerjee et al. (2000), Ozkan (2000), Hovakimian et al. (2001), 
Miguel and Pindado (2001), Nuri and Archer (2001), Omet(2001), Ozkan 
(2001), Antoniou et al. (2002) and Fama and French (2002). The dynamic 
trade off models estimates the speed of adjustment for the firm to go to the 
target debt ratio which is the objective of the capital structure. 
 
Pecking order theory 
 The pecking order theory is all about financing the companies by an 
order from safer to riskier, it means it gives advantage to internal financing 
compared to external financing; prefer debt to convertible bonds; prefer 
hybrid securities compared to equity. Compared to the trade off theory the 
POT29 does not impose a target debt equity ratio; for more debt is 
incorporated in the external financing. According to the theory the first 
source of the company should be internal finance and the last source equity 
securities. The asymmetry of information between managers and investors is 
what leads to a pecking order. Managers (insiders) have information 
advances compared to investors (outsiders). Managers would like to issue 
equity when its overvalued; while investors knowing this would not buy 
shares unless they know that the debt capacity is reached and that have forced 
issuing equity. The end result of this contradicts will be a hierarchical 
financing as suggested by the pecking order. The hierarchy of financing firms 
according to POT suggests that this theory suggests “a portfolio of 
financing”, it does not eliminate any kind of financing but simply it provides 
a “menu” order to be followed. 
 Despite different alternative theories trying to explain the 
differences in the capital structure of firms the empirical evidence is 
ambiguous and it mostly look at big companies; whereas there is a lack of 
evidence for testing specific theories on SME. Their attitude may reflect 
characteristics of both most relevant theories on capital structure: trade-off 
theory and pecking order; but still we need empirical evidence to find which 
one fits best. Theoretically the capital structure is explained by the theories 
but finding the empirical evidence for testing these theories is scarce. 
  Theoretical expectation is that small companies will rely heavily on 
debt and big companies will rely on equity. The evidence that pecking order 
                                                          
29 Abbreviation often used for pecking order theory 
European  Scientific Journal   March  2015  edition vol.11, No.7   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
333 
theory fits less for small companies compared to big ones is contra intuitive 
to the pecking order theory.  Evidence that size does matter is provided in 
Frank and Goyal and Fama and French, 2002) Small companies are more 
prone to asymmetric information(Brennan and Hughes, 1991), and if the 
latter is the basic for explaining the pecking order theory it may be expected 
that pecking order theory should hold for small companies. Evidence does 
not say so. So why pecking order does not hold for small companies? If there 
is no empirical and theoretical explanation we may question the validation of 
the pecking order theory. One more argument works against the theory and is 
the time. Evidence on the 90s is that firms have issued more equity compared 
to debt. This is again not the intuition of pecking order theory. 
 Myers on his paper The capital structure puzzle (1984)  introduced 
the Pecking order theory wheras he suggests the order of financing that 
companies will aim is internal capital, debt capital and the last source equty 
capital. In short word companies prefer internal financing compared to 
external financing. He introduces the POT as an alternative to the trade off 
theory. In the trade off theory there are cost of adjusting the target debt which 
are not explained in the theory- adds Myers.  
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) “Firms whose investment 
opportunities outrun internally generated funds borrow more and more.”p 
221.In the paper they differ managers into optimistic and pessimistic; thus 
optimistic ones would like or repurchase shares while pessimistic ones not.   
They suggest that pecking order explains better the capital structure than the 
trade off. They question the empirical evidence suggesting that trade off 
model explain the capital structure of the firms. The start point is that Myers 
and Majlufs (1984) propose that firms follow a hierarchy of financing 
because of asymmetrical problems and signaling problems.  They test the 
pecking order hypothesis with a model of estimating the change of debt 
explained by the deficit. If the coefficient of deficit is one than the company 
is financed by debt and we have evidence in favor of pecking order. They 
admit that with high debt ratio is difficult to distinguish trade off theory and 
pecking order.  Estimating the simple pecking order model they get estimate 
of 0.85 for the coefficient of deficit and a very high R2. These results favor 
the pecking order theory hypothesis. They use lagged deficit and deficit of 
lagged funds and the pecking order coefficient falls relatively a little so they 
get the corresponding values of 0.64 with R2=0.64 and  0.78 with R2=0.78. 
According to their estimates they suggest that both static trade off and 
pecking order describe the variability of debt but pecking order theory has 
higher explanatory power when  compared to the first.  They also estimate 
Monte Carlo simulation on hypothesized data and therefore firmly suggest 
that we should test the power of explanation before drawing conclusions. 
They address this to the cross section evidence on trade off theory because 
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their evidence is that target adjustment models are not rejected even when 
false and this is not the case with pecking order. ΔDit = α + βpo*DEFit + εit, 
is the formulation of the pecking order coefficient β as suggest by Shyham 
and Mayers (1999). 
 Myers (2001) reasoning the capital structure again starting with 
MM implies that capital structure matters indeed; if the opposite was true 
than there will be no innovation of financing strategies. Reviewing the theory 
on capital structure he concludes that you can find evidence in accordance 
with three theories trade off, pecking order and cash flow theory; but still 
none of them is the general one. Developing a general model derived from 
efficient co investment of human and financial capital is what they conclude 
that the capital theory should do. 
Frank and Goyal (2003) test the pecking order theory using the 
conventional model and adding the financial deficit. Empirically they find 
“The correlation between net equity and the financing deficit is 0.80, while 
the correlation between the financing deficit and net long-term debt is only 
0.48.” which is contrarily to what is predicted by the pecking order. 
Empirically the financing is based on equity- according to their sample data.  
Looking at different time period they conclude that testing pecking order 
depends on the time period we choose.  They also find that the theory is 
related to the size of the firm; it fits better for big companies compared to 
small ones in the periods 1971-1989; whereas this support declines even for 
big companies in the 90s. Their general conclusions are not at all in favor of 
the pecking order theory. Their evidence suggests that companies internal 
financing do not satisfy their needs for financing so they rely on external 
financing out of which more on equity compared to debt. 
Abe de Jong et al(2007) evidence adds to the literature by 
differentiating firms with surpluses, firms with “normal” deficits, and firms 
with large deficits.  Their differentiation of firms gives different estimates for 
pecking order coefficient 0.74 for normal deficits and coefficient of 0.09 for 
large deficits. This suggests that the results depend on the sample of firms 
and the deficits. For the whole sample they find a 0.255 coefficient of 
pecking order coefficient which is smaller than Shyam and Mayers (1999) 
and comparable to Frank and Goyal (2003); and is against the pecking order. 
It suggests that around 25% is financed by debt and 75% by equity. Including 
the size of the firms and dividing the sample before 1989 and after 1989 they 
get relatively high pecking order coefficient for both periods (before 1989 is 
higher) for big firms while they get small pecking order coefficients for small 
firms for both periods. Thus they imply that the differentiation between 
positive and negative deficit should be done before testing pecking order.     
 Zhang and Kanazaki  follow Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
pecking order test and suggest that size and financial deficits and surpluses 
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do matter when testing pecking order theory. They conclude that the simple 
Shyham Mayers model does not describe the capital structure of Japanese 
firms. Leary and Roberts (2007), Chirinko and Singha (2000) and De 
Medeiros and Daher (2004) criticize Shyam and Myers (1999) empirical test 
on pecking order. 
 Benito (2003) examines empirically the two competing theories on 
capital structure the trade off theory and the pecking order theory.  He give 
evidence in favor of the pecking order theory and contrary to trade off theory 
suggesting negative relationship between debt and cash flow and profitability 
and positive relationship between debt and investment for Spanish firms and 
UK firms. Sogorb-Mira and López-Gracia (2003)  come with the evidence 
that Spanish firms have target leverage ratio with a high speed of adjustment 
(0.86). Based on the trade off theory getting a coefficient of 1 means that the 
company has attained the target debt ratio; as we can notice the coefficient 
they estimated is close to one therefore me may conclude that the Spanish 
same for this sample have a high speed of adjusting their target debt ratio. 
Accordingly to the trade off theory they find positive relationship between 
effective tax rate and debt i.e. the higher the tax advantages the higher will be 
the use of debt.   
De Medeiros and  Daher also follow Shyham and Mayers model of 
testing the coefficient of pecking order theory.   Their estimate of pecking 
order coefficient is 0.86 with R2=0.791 which is an evidence in favor of the 
pecking order. Concluding they provide evidence that Brazilian firms do 
follow the pecking order theory. Still they do not provide any timing 
evidence that the pecking order is valid even through time, the evidence is for 
their sample and for the particular year. 
 Ghosh and Cai  employ the nnoparametric fischer probability 
testand Gudman-Kruskan Gamma measures to tes the optimal capital 
structure theory and POT. The result of their sample provides empirical 
evidence for the optimal capital stucture and POT. Their study suggests that 
both theorie coexist and they are not mutually exclusive.   
Ursel (2007) use time series data which is not that common in testing 
pecking order theory and their explanation is that cross section or panel data 
may result with biased data because they take the data from the financial 
statements of companies while they use only publicly issued debt and equity. 
Testing pecking order for Canadian firms she finds evidence against pecking 
order theory for her sample of companies. 
Kovacs and Tech (2004) suggest time variation in adverse selection 
costs in order to get the evidence on pecking order theory.  Their estimates 
suggest that adverse selection cost is statistically and economically 
significant. They find negative relation between the proxy of adverse 
selection cost and external financing. This suggests that firms will rely on 
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external financing when adverse selection costs are low and is according to 
the pecking order theory. Their estimates are a support for a multiperiod 
pecking order theory. However they admit that pecking order theory is not 
“universal” theory of capital structure.  We can add is that their work is 
evidence that adverse selection costs do matter. 
     Cole (2008) estimates form the univariate model suggest that firm 
size, age, profitability, liquidity are inversely related to leverage while 
tangibility, creditworthiness, number of banks and non-banks that provide 
financial service, S corporations and C corporations (compared to 
propertiorship) has positive relationship with leverage. Thus his evidence 
suggests that private firms financing choice in US do work as pecking order 
theory. Their estimates are supportive to pecking order and contradictory to 
the trade off theory.  
 
Financing choices theories vs. practice 
 While theories have the economic rationale the evidence form practice 
does not support them, supports them partly, gives contradictory results and 
with no general model employed yet it leaves room for research. Practice 
shows the variety of financing alternative practices; but does not show much 
how we come to that result. What we suggest is that may be is useful to 
additionally look at the legislation regarded to companies, taxes, bankruptcy, 
financing, financial markets, banking system and so on. Financial slack is 
used to finance companies when there is no external financing or is 
expensive. According to pecking order firms with more financial slack should 
use less leverage. 
 After looking the theory now let see some facts from the practice. 
Below we will represent charts that are based on BEEPS data on SME for 
2005 that includes 28 countries. On this part we will focus on the question on 
sources of financing that companies use to finance working capital and new 
investment. 
 In figure 2 we represent the percentages of different sources for the 
whole sample of countries. The numbers suggest that SME are primarily 
financed by internal funds, than by bank borrowings in general (private 
banks, foreign banks and state owned banks), than by equity and different 
other sources. This order of financing sources is in line with the pecking 
order. 
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Figure 2 Source: BEEPS, all countries– SME financing sources for working capital 
 
 Now on the following charts we want to see more detailed pictures for 
sources of financing working capital by country for Macedonia and Albania. 
 
 
Figure 3 BEEPS 2005,  Macedonia–          Figure 4 BEEPS, 2005- Albania –SME 
SME financing sources for working capital     financing sources for working capital 
 
        When looking at data for Macedonia (figure 3) only we can see that 
the primary source remain internal funds, followed by informal sources, 
family loans, trade credit from suppliers, bank loan in general , equity and 
other sources in a small parts. Not surprisingly we see the relatively high 
percentage from informal sources and family loans; it’s just an evidence for 
the informal economy in the country. However it shows as pecking order 
theory suggests the preference of debt over equity; internal funds to external 
funds.   
       The last chart on financing sources of working capital is the case of 
Albania. The numbers are interesting; SME in Albania (figure 4) are financed 
by internal funds mostly; than by bank borrowing and only 5% of the total of 
financing is financed by alternative funds. Interesting companies declared 
that they are not at all financed by equity. The numbers may suggest that this 
may be the perfect case of pecking order theory; but the numbers may be as a 
result of not functioning of capital markets. More detailed analysis should be 
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done before drawing any conclusion. Informal sources are used relatively 
little as a source of financing working capital. 
       Even for new investments the same order of financing is generated 
for the whole sample of countries: internal funds, bank borrowing at general, 
equity and then smaller percentages of other sources. Thus differentiating 
between financing working capital and new investments does not change the 
conclusion for the whole sample- numbers suggest that SME follow a 
pecking order financing. Now let’s see how the numbers for country cases 
are. The general conclusion does not change for the order of financing even 
for new investments. What we can notice is the increasing percentage of bank 
borrowing and other sources compared to financing working capital. The use 
of informal sources decreases when financing new investment compared to 
working capital. 
 
Figure 5 BEEPs 2005- Macedonia, SME      Figure 6 BEEPS 2005- Albania, SME 
financing sources for new investment           SME financing sources for new investment 
 
In Albania case the percentage of internal funds remains high even as 
a source for financing new investments. What changes is the relative 
magnitude of foreign bank borrowings (increases) and private bank 
borrowing (increases less than the previous) for financing new investment 
compared to financing working capital. Equity is not used as a source of 
financing nor for new investments. 
When collecting data is difficult to obtain absolute values, therefore 
even in the charts presented the data gains are as % of the total of financing. 
 
Conclusion 
 The highlights that literature gives on the choice debt or equity are on 
the importance of asymmetric information (Ross 1977), agency cost (Jensen 
and Meckling 1978, Jensen 1986; Myers 1977). A high productivity firm 
would prefer to issue debt rather than equity while bankruptcy costs may lead 
to equity finance. Jensen and Meckling 1978 introduced the optimum 
combination of debt and equity to minimize agency costs. The greater the 
debt the greater are the agency costs. Few studies have used cross country 
comparisons to test the capital structure theory. Marsh and Taggart find 
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evidence that firms adjust target debt ratio; also Bowen et al (1982) suggest 
that debt converges to industry mean, Myers (1982) also concluded that 
companies have target debt rate. Myers 1984 introduces POT, while the 
preferences of firms for internal funds are described in Donaldson (1961) and 
Ross, Westerfield and Juffe(2005). The POT hypothesis are tested and 
proved valid by Taggart (1986). The theoretical model of POT is in Mayers 
and Majluf (1984); firms behavior is as in pecking order (Claget 1992); the 
theory test is in Shyam and Myers (1999); Fama and French (2002), Frank 
and Goyal (2003). 
Asset tangibility and profitability may be used to compare which 
theory fits best for a sample of data. Companies with more tangible assets 
may have less asymmetric information. Growth opportunities are positively 
related to the market to book ratio; thus the higher the latter the more growth 
opportunities. 
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